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ONE MORE BRICK IN THE WALL: THE
IMPACT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OF EX JURIS DEFENDANTS ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
Matthew Johnson
“When I have been in Canada, I have never heard a Canadian
refer to an American as a “foreigner.” He is just an “American.” And,
in the same way, in the United States, Canadians are not “foreigners,”
they are “Canadians.” That simple little distinction illustrates to me
better than anything else the relationship between our two countries.”1
INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada have a lengthy and historical
development of their common law and statutory standards for
obtaining personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants in civil litigation.2
The United States’ doctrine has been developing since the midnineteenth century.3 Canada, however, followed a rigid common law

1
Sarah Lipkis, United States of Canada, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Oct. 22,
2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/10/22/united-statescanada(quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
2
See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (stating the proposition
that in personam jurisdiction cannot be had over an absent defendant, but in rem
jurisdiction can be had over the absent defendant’s property); see also Moran v. Pyle
Nat’l (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393 (discussing in personam jurisdiction in tort cases
over a foreign defendant).
3
See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727, 731; see also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding a court may not exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant that has not purposefully availed itself to doing business within the
jurisdiction).
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system until the end of the twentieth century.4 Since 1990, there have
been five important cases altering the current Canadian doctrine on
personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants.5 Most recently, the 2012
decision of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda marked a notable shift from
its predecessor, Muscutt v. Courcelles.6
Today, the United States’ greatest ally and biggest trading
partner is Canada.7 As China continues to establish itself as a global
economic power, retaining close ties is important for both nations. 8
Though executives, legislatures, and judiciaries exercise comity9
between nations,10 the judiciary has the ability to influence and control
the other branches’ exercise of comity through its decisions and
interpretations.11 Because of this significant judicial power, this
Muscutt v. Courcelles, 2002 CanLII 44957 (ON CA).
Id. ¶ 14-17 (citing Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; Amchem
Prod. Inc. v. B.C. (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897; Hunt v. T&N plc.,
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077).
6
Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) A “Real and Substantial” Mess: The Law of
Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 396, 402 (2013).
7
See U.S. Relations with Canada, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Aug. 23, 2013),
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (noting the U.S. and Canada trade $1.6
billion worth of goods, daily, and three hundred thousand people cross their shared
border, daily); see also, Doug Lamborn, U.S. Rep. from Colorado, Building Keystone
Pipeline will Cement U.S.-Canadian Relations, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/286669-building-keystone-pipeline-will-cementus-canada-relations (describing Canada as the United States’ most important trading
partner, sharing “close ties in culture, language and values”).
8
See Lipkis, supra note 1 (discussing the potential benefits of the United
States and Canada forming an E.U.-like relationship to combat the efficiency of
China’s form of capitalism); When Giants Slow Down, ECONOMIST (July 27, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582257-most-dramatic-anddisruptive-period-emerging-market-growth-world-has-ever-seen (discussing the
slowing but steadying growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China).
9
Comity is defined as “the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
10
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining legislatures practice “prescriptive comity” by limiting the
reach of their laws when enacting them).
11
See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 14 (2010).
4
5
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comment recognizes the important role courts play in maintaining and
increasing comity between the United States and Canada.
This comment will argue that the Van Breda decision has
moved Canadian courts closer to United States courts on the issue of
personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, which in turn has created
increased comity among the two nations. Part II of this comment will
introduce the history of personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants
in the United States and Canada. Furthermore, Part II will briefly
discuss comity and its international role. Part III analyzes the current
state of jurisdiction in the United States and compares it with the new
Canadian standard set forth in Van Breda. Through this comparison,
this comment will explore the opportunity for increased comity
between the two nations. Part IV proposes that the current positions
of both nations regarding personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants
allows for greater comity between the two nations, increasing their
economic partnership and individual international strength.
I.

Historical Background of Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris
Defendants in the United States and Canada and the Role of
International Comity

A.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in the United
States

The United States’ modern day jurisdiction found its roots in
Pennoyer v. Neff,12 but has undergone substantial change, culminating in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.13
1. Pennoyer to International Shoe. — In Pennoyer v. Neff, the
United States Supreme Court determined due process does not give a
state the authority to assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant who does not personally assent to jurisdiction.14 In
reaching this determination, the Court focused on two “principles of
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730.
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011); see generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing the evolution
of Supreme Court rulings on personal jurisdiction).
14
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730 (citing D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165 (1851)).
12
13
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public law.”15 First, every state has jurisdiction over persons and
property within its jurisdiction. Second, a state does not have
jurisdiction over persons or property beyond its jurisdiction.16
Relying on previous state and federal court decisions, however,
the Pennoyer Court reiterated that a plaintiff who is unable to subject a
foreign defendant to in personam jurisdiction may attach a defendant’s
property within the court’s jurisdiction to hail the defendant into
court.17 But, if the defendant fails to appear, any judgment may “only
bind [the defendant] to the extent of such property.”18 The Court
noted the burdens a state may impose upon foreign persons.19
In the courtroom, Pennoyer v. Neff has essentially become
irrelevant.20 As legal scholar Michael Hoffheimer states, “[i]t is late in
the day to argue . . . Pennoyer.”21 However, the court’s reasoning is still
relevant to understanding and discussing the connection between due
process and personal jurisdiction.22 With increasing global complexity,
the United States Supreme Court found itself needing to shift toward
a new doctrine, which could better adjudicate the increased mobility of
citizens between different states.23
Nearly five decades after Pennoyer v. Neff was handed down, the
Supreme Court, in an attempt to expand the reach of Pennoyer,24 actually
began to subtly shift away from its precedent.25 The Court in Hess v.
Id. at 722.
Id. (citing Story, J., Confl. Laws, sect. 539) (emphasis added).
17
Id. at 724-25 (citing Cooper v. Reynolds 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870);
Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mas. 35 (1828)).
18
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724 (citing Picquet, 5 Mas. 35).
19
Id. at 734-35 (conditions for marriage/divorce, requiring foreign
persons to appoint an agent to receive service of process when entering into a
partnership within the state, and conditions for enforcing obligations against
corporate officers other than personal service).
20
See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1007 (2012).
21
Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 554.
22
Id. at 554-55.
23
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1003.
24
Id.
25
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (asserting the power
of a state to exclude a non-resident confers upon the state a power to imply
appointment of an agent through use of state highways, rendering physical presence
15
16
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Pawloski allowed the state of Massachusetts to serve an out-of-state
defendant, who was involved in an accident, pursuant to a
Massachusetts statute.26 The statute stated that in using Massachusetts’
highways, a driver appoints the registrar as his agent for service of
process.27 Thus, once a driver enters Massachusetts, he impliedly
consents that a state official may act as his agent, thereby making it
possible for the state to obtain jurisdiction over him in the event he is
involved in an accident or collision within the State’s borders.28 Despite
citing numerous authorities,29 all of which appeared to direct the court
toward a strict Pennoyer ruling, the Court opted to base its decision on
public policy reasons.30 By using this type of analysis, as well as relevant
case law,31 the Court determined that whether the appointment of a
state officer is formal or implied is “not substantial” so far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned.32 Thus, by allowing an implied
appointment of an agent by non-resident drivers, the Court had a
manner in which it could obtain jurisdiction over the non-resident
driver, and despite not having attachable property it could enforce a
judgment as Pennoyer would allow.
While Hess helps illustrate the difficulties courts faced in
applying Pennoyer to modern America, it did not address the difficulties
associated with determining jurisdiction over corporations.33 Courts
formulated different rules to define when a state could and could not
claim jurisdiction over a corporation doing business within its
boundaries.34 The Supreme Court tried to settle the split in 1945 and
in the territory unnecessary for service); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s
“Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63
S.C. L. REV. 729 (2012) (noting the court shifted the analysis from whether
Massachusetts lacked authority to serve the defendant, rendering any judgment as
contrary to the Due Process Clause, to whether enactment of the statute violated the
Due Process Clause).
26
90 Gen. Laws Mass. as amended by Stat. 1923, c. 431, § 2.
27
See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356-57.
28
Id. at 356-57.
29
See id. at 355 (citing e.g. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1918); Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1894); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714).
30
See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356.
31
See id. at 356 (quoting Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)).
32
Hess, 274 U.S. at 357.
33
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1007.
34
Id.
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provide a universal standard in determining jurisdiction over
corporations.35
2. International Shoe. — In International Shoe Company v.
Washington, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies substantive criteria for deciding
personal jurisdiction issues.36 Criticism has been levied against the
Court, however, for its vagueness in defining what general jurisdiction
entails.37
International Shoe Company was a St. Louis-based company,
which sent sample shoes to approximately eleven agents located in the
state of Washington et alibi.38 Washington wanted to collect
employment taxes, which were due from International Shoe.39 Notice
was served to International Shoe’s agent in Washington and by
certified mail to its home office.40 International Shoe argued that its
activities in Washington were not “sufficient to manifest its
‘presence,’” and thus, the state of Washington violated its due process
rights in subjecting it to suit.41
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Stone analyzed Pennoyerera decisions42 and determined that the satisfaction of due process in
personal jurisdiction “depend[s] rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity . . . .”43 Based on this principle, Chief Justice Stone
announced what is known as the “minimum contacts” doctrine.44 As
stated by Chief Justice Stone, “due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Perdue, supra note 25, at 733.
37
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (Black, J., concurring); Hoffheimer, supra
note 13; Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998); Perdue, supra note 25 at
734-35.
38
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
39
Id. at 312-13. The commissions received by the salespersons were in
excess of $31,000.
40
Id.
41
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315.
42
Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008.
43
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
44
Id. at 316.
35
36
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within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it. . . .”45 Chief Justice Stone continued to rule that, “the
maintenance of the suit [can]not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”46
Chief Justice Stone’s “minimum contacts” doctrine provides
no real guidance on how courts are to determine a corporation’s
presence within a certain jurisdiction.47 To better substantiate its new
standard, the Court returned to the Pennoyer era and sorted cases into
one of four categories.48 The categories assist in determining whether
a corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state to
allow jurisdiction.49 Chief Justice Stone asserts that those cases
involving continuous and systematic activities related to the claim at
bar, and cases involving isolated incidents not related to the claim at
bar are obvious cases in which jurisdiction could be conferred and not
conferred, respectively.50 Conversely, those cases involving continuous
activities not related to the claims at bar or single occasional acts by a
corporate agent make the jurisdictional determination more difficult.51
The “minimum contacts” doctrine has served as an expansion
of the basic principles set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff and its progeny.52 The
new test serves as a policy-based and flexible analytical approach,

Id.; but see, id. at 322 (Black, J., concurring) (the Court went too far by
announcing its new due process rule).
46
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940); see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91(1917)).
47
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561 (“the court’s new ‘minimum
contacts’ requirement added little more than the appropriate label when a court
decided that a case satisfied constitutional requirements.”); See also Douglas D.
McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 761 (2003)
(criticizing the minimum contacts test).
48
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 558-61 (describing the four categories
as cases involving: (1) a corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts within a
state; (2) the casual presence of a corporate agent, or an isolated incident unrelated
to the claims at bar; (3) continuous and systematic contacts distinct from the causes
of action; and (4) single occasional acts by an agent in the state).
49
See id.
50
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
51
Id. at 318.
52
Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561.
45
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taking into consideration concerns like fairness, to both states and
corporations.53
3. Onward Ho!: Development of the “Minimum Contacts” Doctrine. —
Since the ruling of the “minimum contacts” doctrine in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court has
proceeded to split personal jurisdiction into two categories. These
categories are 1) specific, “case-linked” jurisdiction, and 2) general
jurisdiction.54
The specific, case-linked category of cases has been bifurcated
to examine, first, the minimum contacts of a corporation within the
forum, and second, the fairness of hailing the corporation into such
forum.55 Furthermore, the Court has continued to apply this analysis
to the realm of products liability cases, adopting a “stream of
commerce” doctrine.56
The second category, general jurisdiction, involves the two
categories of cases proffered in International Shoe in which personal
jurisdiction determinations are obvious.57 The following subsections
will discuss each of the categories with more detail.58
a. Stream of commerce and fairness. – In World Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Supreme Court set forth a “stream
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561;
McFarland, supra note 47, at 761; McMunigal, supra note 37, at 195-96.
54
Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez!
Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability
Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 116 (2012).
55
Id. at 117.
56
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
57
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (cases involving continuous and systematic
activities related to the claim at bar are cases in which jurisdiction could obviously be
conferred, while cases of isolated incidents not related to the claim at bar are
situations in which jurisdiction could obviously not be conferred); see also SimpsonWood, supra note 54, at 118 (describing these cases as those in which “a foreign
defendant’s contacts with the forum do not relate to the cause of action, but are “so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state”)
(citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).
58
The “minimum contacts” portion of category one will not be discussed,
as it was expounded upon in the previous section.
53
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of commerce” standard by determining whether a corporation
“purposefully availed” itself to the forum.59 The Court based this
doctrine on fairness.60 In doing so, the Court listed five factors to be
considered in determining whether it is fair to hail a defendant into
court in a particular forum: (1) the defendant must have a relationship
with the forum which would make it “reasonable . . . to require the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there,” (2)
the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) “the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) the
interest of the entire interstate judicial system in the most efficient
resolution of controversies, and (5) the interest of States in “furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.”61
World Wide Volkswagen involved New York residents who were
injured when their car, purchased in New York, exploded in
Oklahoma.62 The plaintiffs brought suit against the vehicle’s regional
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and its retail dealer, Seaway, inter
alia.63 Seaway only sold cars in Massena, New York, and World-Wide’s
market only extended to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.64
In determining the defendants could not be brought into court
in Oklahoma, the Court founded its reasoning in fairness.65 It did so
through a two-prong approach based in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.66

See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; See also Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441 (1961) (that stream of
commerce was originally espoused in this case).
60
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 288.
63
See id. (The plaintiffs argued that it was foreseeable that cars sold by
World-Wide and Seaway would travel to Oklahoma. From this the plaintiffs asserted
World-Wide and Seaway had minimum contacts necessary to attain personal
jurisdiction).
64
See id. at 298.
65
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294.
66
See id. at 292, 297-99; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11.
59
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Professor Carol Andrews67 explains that the first prong ensures
protection to foreign defendants by limiting the ability of states to
exceed their jurisdiction as “coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”68
This is evident when Justice White writes, “[we] stress[] that the Due
Process clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly
administration of the laws.’”69
The second prong protects the defendant from litigating in an
inconvenient forum by examining facts within the five factors listed by
the court.70 In applying the second prong, Justice White notes that
fairness under the Due Process Clause does not turn on a defendant’s
ability to foresee that its product may end up in a specific forum.71
Rather, a defendant’s “conduct and connection with the forum state”
must be “such that . . . [through its] purposeful[] avail[ment] . . . it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the
risk of burdensome litigation.”72
Professor Wendy Perdue73 has argued that the World Wide
Volkswagen Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause shifted
the Clause away from a procedural jurisdiction safeguard to a
substantive “defendant-focused approach.”74 This criticism certainly
carries some merit, as Justice White writes that even when fairness is
not lacking, the Due Process Clause may “divest the State of its power
to render a valid judgment.”75 Regardless of Professor Perdue’s, and
other scholars’, critical view of the Court’s reasoning in World Wide
Volkswagen, gaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
67

Douglas Arant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of

68

See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 44

Law.
U.S. at 292).
69

World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 293-94 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.

at 319).
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 297.
72
Id.
73 Dean, University of Richmond School of Law.
74
See Perdue, supra note 25, at 733-34 (commenting that the Court
incorrectly restates the holding from Pennoyer v. Neff allowing it to shift the Due
Process Clause from a mechanism for a procedural challenge of jurisdiction to a
substantive standard by which to assess a jurisdictional challenge).
75
World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294.
70
71
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requires a fairness examination under the Due Process Clause.76
However, prior to the fairness examination, the defendant had to
purposefully avail himself to that jurisdiction by introducing his
product into that jurisdiction’s stream of commerce; the mere
possibility of the product entering the foreign jurisdiction was not
enough.77
Later cases have followed the fairness standard established in
World-Wide Volkswagen.78 In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., the plaintiff
sought jurisdiction in New Hampshire to bring suit against Hustler
Magazine.79 In holding that New Hampshire had jurisdiction to hear
the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court reasoned Hustler Magazine
had sufficient minimum contacts in New Hampshire80 such that it was
fair to compel the magazine to face suit in New Hampshire.81 Beyond
the extent of Hustler’s sales in New Hampshire, the Court based its
reasoning of fairness on the second World Wide Volkswagen factor,
stating that New Hampshire had a strong interest in holding Hustler
accountable for libel committed within its jurisdiction.82 This interest
is created because Hustler’s libel of Keeton harms both Keeton and
New Hampshire’s own citizens who read Hustler’s publication.83
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz84 made a very subtle but important
change to the original two-prong standard established in World-Wide
See id. at 294-95.
See id. at 297-98.
78
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); see also Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
79
Plaintiff Keeton assisted in the production of Hustler Magazine. Her
name appears in several places on the magazines. Hustler sold approximately 10,00015,000 copies of Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire. Plaintiff sued Hustler,
claiming Hustler libeled her in five separate issues of its magazine. Keeton brought
suit in New Hampshire, claiming New Hampshire could exert personal jurisdiction
over Hustler. Neither plaintiff nor defendant was a resident of New Hampshire.
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
80
See id. (Hustler sold approximately 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its
magazines each month in New Hampshire.).
81
Id. at 781.
82
See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775-76.
83
See id.
84
Defendants Rudzewicz and MacShara entered into a franchising
agreement with Burger King Corp. Burger King was headquartered in Miami,
76
77
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Volkswagen.85 Above the surface, the Court’s holding was quite simple
and aligned with its predecessors.86 According to the Court, the
contract between Rudzewicz and Burger King created a “continuing
obligation” between himself and Burger King, a resident of Florida,
thereby availing himself of the “privilege of conducting business
there . . . [and being] shielded by [Florida’s] laws.”87 Thus, it was
foreseeable that he may be brought into court in Florida.88
Below the surface, however, Justice Brennan attempted to shift
the Court away from a strong defendant-centered minimum contacts
test by redefining the burden of proof required to defeat personal
jurisdiction.89 Brennan made clear that, once the plaintiff has proven
the existence of a contact, the defendant has what Professor Richard
Freer90 calls a “strikingly onerous burden.”91 That burden requires the
defendant to present a “compelling case” showing jurisdiction to be
“so gravely difficult and inconvenient [he] . . . is at a severe
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”92 As a result of the
increased burden on the defendant, much of the Court’s discussion in
subsequent cases has focused on the contacts of a defendant with a
forum more than the fairness of hailing a defendant into a particular
forum.93

Florida, but had a regional office in Michigan. The franchising agreement required
payments over a twenty-year period, which would total more than one million
dollars. Defendants fell behind on payments to Burger King and subsequently
entered into negotiations with Burger King’s Michigan and Florida offices to settle
payment issues. After negotiations broke down, Burger King filed suit in Florida.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464-68.
85
See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 570-72 (2012).
86
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462 (a Michigan defendant had contracted
with a Florida corporation, which, according to the court, fairly availed him to
Florida’s jurisdiction since the contract had an abundance of requirements, all having
a connection with Florida).
87
Id. at 476.
88
Id. at 474.
89
See Freer, supra note 85, at 571-72.
90 Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
91
Id. at 572.
92
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata-Off Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
93
See Freer, supra note 85, at 574-76, 581, 589.
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Interestingly, despite the increased burden of proof on the
defendant, two years later, in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal.,94 the Court used the fairness standard to find that Asahi could not
be brought into court in California.95 Justice O’Connor and three other
justices determined that, in addition to jurisdiction being unfair,
California lacked sufficient contacts with Asahi.96 The Court reasoned
that “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.”97 Simple awareness by a defendant that its product will be swept
into a particular forum through a stream of commerce does not
amount to purposefully directing its product toward that state by
placing the product within such stream.98
Post-Asahi, to gain specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, a forum must survive a two-prong approach.99 First, it must
prove minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum.100 In
the case of a corporation the Court will look to whether or not the
defendant purposefully placed its product in the stream of
commerce.101 Second, it must prove that it is fair to hail the defendant
into the forum.102 With the post-Burger King increased burden of proof
upon the defendant to rebut jurisdiction by arguing the forum is unfair,

94
Plaintiff was a California citizen whose wife died in a motorcycle crash
after one of the tires blew out. Plaintiff brought suit against Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co., Ltd. Cheng Shin sought indemnification from Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
Cheng Shin bought parts from Asahi and incorporated those parts in tires it sold.
Cheng Shin did approximately twenty percent of its business in the United States.
Asahi has no offices, property, or agents in California. Its offices were located in
Japan. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102.
95
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 576 (Asahi is
the only case in which fairness was used to reject jurisdiction).
96
Freer, supra note 85, at 574-75.
97
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
98
Id.
99
See Freer, supra note 85, at 552-53; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at
1010-11.
100
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.
101
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
102
See id.
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defendants’ best chance of overcoming jurisdiction is proving a lack of
contacts, and the case law has reflected this shift towards contacts.103
b. Goodyear v. Brown: A look at general jurisdiction. – As
discussed earlier, Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe classified
two categories of cases: those in which the alleged acts are tied directly
to the contacts of the defendant and those in which the alleged acts are
not tied to the contacts of the defendant.104 Professor Carol Andrews
has termed cases: in which the alleged acts are tied directly to the
defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts as “easy yes” cases;
in which the defendant had “isolated” contacts with the forum or the
alleged acts are not tied to those contacts as “easy no” cases; in which
the defendant’s contacts were extensive but the alleged acts were
unrelated or instances where the defendant’s contacts were “isolated”
but the alleged act was tied to those contacts as “maybe” cases.105
Andrews further notes that the “easy yes” cases and the
“maybe” cases involving isolated but related contacts have been
termed by the court as specific jurisdiction.106 Those cases were
discussed above. This subsection seeks to inform the reader as to the
Court’s position on the “easy no” and continuous but unrelated
contacts cases, now termed general personal jurisdiction.107
The most recent case involving general personal jurisdiction is
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown.108 The defendant contested
jurisdiction in North Carolina as improper.109 The defendants had no
connections to North Carolina outside of their parent company and a
small fraction of tires they sold in North Carolina, typically custom
ordered for specific vehicles.110 According to the Court, the “paradigm
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction . . . for a corporation

See Freer, supra note 85, at 589.
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13.
105
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008-09.
106
Id. at 1009.
107
See id. at 1009-10.
108
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2848 (subsidiaries of Goodyear U.S.A. were
sued by the parents of children killed when a bus, using tires manufactured by the
subsidiaries, rolled over near Paris, France).
109
Id. at 2852.
110
Id.
103
104
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[is] . . . one in which [it] is fairly regarded as at home.”111 Hoffheimer
states that the Court understands “at home” as relating to the
defendant’s state of incorporation, its principal place of business, and
potentially anywhere in which it has “substantial, continuous, and
systematic activity.”112 Using the paradigmatic forum analysis, the
Court determined that the defendant subsidiaries’ connections to
North Carolina “fall far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general
business contacts’ necessary” for jurisdiction over them on claims
“unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”113
In reaching its conclusion, the Court contrasted the prior case
of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.114 Perkins involved a Philippine
mining company which ceased its operations to Ohio during World
War II.115 The company’s president maintained an office in Ohio and
supervised its mining activities from the Ohio office.116 The Court in
Perkins found that, because Ohio was the principal place of business,
even temporarily, general jurisdiction was proper in Ohio.117
The Court also compared another prior case, Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,118 in which general jurisdiction in
Texas was found improper when a Colombian helicopter operation
company was sued in a wrongful death suit.119 The defendant’s only
ties to Texas were: acceptance of checks drawn on a Houston bank
account; helicopters, equipment, and training services purchased from
a Texas corporation; and personnel training in Texas.120 The Helicopteros
Court concluded “‘mere purchases [made in the forum State], even if
occurring at regular intervals, are not enough [for general] jurisdiction

Id. at 2853-54.
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551.
113
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
114
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
115
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.
116
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.
117
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; see also Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
118
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408.
119
See id. at 415-16.
120
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
111
112
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over a non-resident corporation” when the purchase transactions are
not related to the cause of action.121
The Goodyear Court leaned towards the reasoning of
Helicopteros, indicating that the only way in which systematic activity
within a forum will allow for general jurisdiction is if such activity takes
place at extremely high volumes.122
After Goodyear, the state of general jurisdiction is not fully
known. It appears that the Court stripped general jurisdiction down
to the point that it is only applicable in cases in which the corporation
is, literally, “at home” in the forum.124
123

Thus, to obtain jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant in the
United States, a forum must be able to obtain either specific
jurisdiction, which is focused on minimum contacts and fairness, or
general jurisdiction, which is focused on whether the defendant is “at
home.” The Goodyear court informed us that, since International Shoe,
the Supreme Court has focused primarily on cases involving specific
personal jurisdiction.125 Nevertheless, general jurisdiction still exists as
an option for plaintiffs who cannot obtain specific jurisdiction over a
defendant.
Having surveyed the development of American jurisprudence
on personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, we must proceed to
survey such jurisprudence in Canada.
B.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in Canada

Modern day personal jurisdiction in Canada is rooted in the
English House of Lords, which developed a “real and substantial

See id. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418).
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 592; but see Freer, supra note 85, at
587-88 (arguing that even high levels of sales activity is unlikely to justify general
personal jurisdiction).
123
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551.
124
See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551; see also Freer, supra note 85, at
585.
125
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
121
122
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connection” test.126 After Indyka, the real and substantial connection
test was employed three more times before, in 1990, becoming
“enshrined as a central jurisdictional principle” in Morguard Investments
Ltd. v. De Savoye.127
In 1993, Hunt v. T&N PLC. made clear that the principles
enunciated in Morguard were constitutionally founded.128 Over the next
nineteen years, the Supreme Court of Canada defined what a “real and
substantial” connection was, culminating its efforts in its 2012 decision
of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda.129 This section will summarily track
the Supreme Court of Canada’s development of the real and
substantial connection test from its roots in Indyka to its current state
following Van Breda.
1. Early Development of the “Real and Substantial Connection”
Doctrine. — The real and substantial connection doctrine originated in
the English case Indyka v. Indyka.130 Prior to Indyka, an English woman’s
ability to obtain a divorce was dependent upon a set of particular
rules.131 With the introduction of the real and substantial connection
test, the previous rules were replaced by a general principle revolving
around the strength of a person’s connection with a particular
forum.132 The Supreme Court of Canada expanded the use of the real
and substantial connection test, in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd.,
to torts.133
In Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada held it reasonable to
find a real and substantial connection with a forum, thereby allowing
that forum to have jurisdiction, if a defendant could reasonably foresee
that its product would cause injury and be used and consumed in the
Joost Blom, Q.C. & Elizabeth Edinger, Conflicts of Law: The Chimera of
the Real and Substantial Connection Test, 38 U.B.C L. REV. 373, 374-76 (2005)(stating that
the English case Indyka v. Indyka established a more uniform system of divorce).
127
Id. at 377-78.
128
Id. at 378, 385.
129
See generally, Blom, supra note 126; Peter J. Pliszka, My Place or Yours?
SCC Sets New and Improved Test for Jurisdiction in Canada, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 273 (2013).
130
See Blom, supra note 126, at 375.
131
Id. at 375-76.
132
Id. at 376.
133
See Moran v. Pyle National (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, 408-09; see
also Blom, supra note 126, at 377.
126
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foreign jurisdiction.134 The Court’s decision resembled its American
counterpart’s stream of commerce inquiry.135 Like the Court in WorldWide Volkswagen, the Moran Court would require a strong enough
relationship between the defendant and the forum to make it fair to
require the defendant to litigate in the foreign forum.136
The Moran holding further compares with the American tort
case of Calder v. Jones.137 The United States Supreme Court held in Calder
that California could assert jurisdiction over two Florida journalists,
with essentially no contacts to California, because they wrote a libelous
story about a California citizen with the knowledge and expectation
that it would be widely circulated in California.138 In both cases, the
American and Canadian Supreme Courts showed they were willing to
extend a stream of commerce-like analysis to tort cases.
Almost two decades after Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada
once again relied on the real and substantial connection test.139 In
Morguard v. De Savoye, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue
of whether a judgment in one province could be recognized by
another.140 In determining that the Alberta judgment should be
recognized in British Columbia, La Forest J. focused on balancing
order and fairness.141 Order, La Forest J. opined, dictates that a foreign
provinces’ judgment should be recognized across Canada for reasons

Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. (Can.) at 409.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
136
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. at
(Can.) 409.
137
Calder, 465 U.S. 783.
138
Id. at 789-90.
139
Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 1077; Blom,
supra note 23, at 378; Monestier, supra note 6, at 180-81.
140
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1082. The Ontario Court of Appeal
subsequently explained that, though Morguard explained the real and substantial
connection test “from the perspective of recognition and enforcement, La Forest J.
made it clear that precisely the same real and substantial connection test applies to
the assumption of jurisdiction against an out-of-province defendant.” Muscutt v.
Courcelles, [2002] CanLII 44957, para. 38 (ON CA).
141
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at
381.
134
135
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of comity.142 La Forest J. compared this idea to the United States’ full
faith and credit clause.143
Fairness, La Forest J. determined, was more important than
order.144 While order provided ample reasoning to support judgment
recognition across Canada, fairness was a necessity.145 La Forest J.
described fairness as the relationship between the jurisdiction’s
contacts and the defendant or subject matter of the suit.146
Accordingly, the Morguard court acknowledges three grounds upon
which a court can claim jurisdiction over a defendant: 1) the defendant
is served in personam; 2) the defendant consents to jurisdiction through
agreement or attornment;147 and 3) there is a real and substantial
connection between the defendant or cause of action and the forum.148
Though Morguard focused on the recognition of interprovincial
judgments, La Forest J. provides undertones throughout his opinion
which seem to relate the expressed principles to the realm of private
international law.149

See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1096-97.
See id. at 1100, 1102.
144
See id. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 381 (arguing the
Morguard decision sacrificed order for fairness).
145
See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103.
146
Id.
147
“Attornment occurs when a defendant, by his or her conduct consents
or submits to a jurisdiction . . . without reserving its right to challenge the claimant’s
chosen jurisdiction at a later time.” Melissa Kehrer & John A. Olah, Trips, Traps and
Jurisdiction
Part
2,
CLAIMS
CAN.
(Feb.
2008),
http://www.claimscanada.ca/issues/article.aspx?aid= 1000219849&er=NA; see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (9th ed. 2009).
148
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103-04. For a hypothetical example of all
three grounds, see also Stephen C. Nadler, Navigating the Litigation Landscape in Canada:
Securing Evidence and Enforcing Judgments, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 42; Cf.
Monestier, supra note 6, at n. 2 (noting Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, places the most
importance on whether there is a real and substantial connection, while other indicia
(presence and consent) bolster the real and substantial connection).
149
See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1095 (“Modern states, however, cannot
live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments given in other countries in
certain circumstances”); id. at 1097 (“what must underlie a modern system of private
international law are principles of order and fairness, principles that ensure security
of transactions with justice”); id. at 1098 (noting that the United States and European
countries have created more generous rules for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments).
142
143
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Shortly after Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunt
v. T & N plc.,150 reiterated the importance of order and fairness but
chose not to further define the scope and application of the real and
substantial connection test.151 La Forest J. wrote that the real and
substantial connection test was a flexible test which simply “captured
the idea that there must be some limits on claims to jurisdiction.” 152
The Hunt opinion details some prior applications of the real and
substantial connection test, concluding that “no test can perhaps ever
be rigidly applied . . . [and] the assumption of . . . jurisdiction must
ultimately be guided by the requirements of order and fairness, not a
mechanical counting of contacts or connections.”153
The plaintiff in Hunt, a resident of British Columbia, alleged he
was injured due to the tortious behavior of the defendants domiciled
in Quebec.154 The plaintiff brought action in British Columbia and
sought production of various documents.155 The defendants refused to
produce the documents on the ground that they were not required to
do so because they were protected by the Quebec Business Concerns
Records Act.156 On the basis of Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the Quebec Act was not applicable to the proceedings in
British Columbia.157
The Hunt decision elevated the Morguard principles to
constitutional status, indicating that they cannot be overridden by
provincial courts.158 The Court determined that the idea of Canadian
Hunt v. T & N plc., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289.
Blom, supra note 126, at 385.
152
Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 325.
153
Id. at 326; cf. Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (focusing on the fairness of California
exercising jurisdiction despite a lack of contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
293-94 (stressing that the Due Process Clause ensures fairness and the orderly
administration of the laws); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958) (describing
the evolution of American in personam jurisdiction from the rigid Pennoyer v. Neff to
the more flexible Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington).
154
Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 297.
155
Id. at 298.
156
Id. at 298; see generally Robert Wisner, Uniformity, Diversity, and Provincial
Extraterritorality: Hunt v. T & N plc., 40 MCGILL L.J. 759, 762 (1995) (explaining the
Quebec Business Concerns Records Act is a blocking statute, prohibiting the removal of
business documents from the province for the purpose of litigation).
157
See Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 331-32.
158
See id. at 324; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 385.
150
151
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provinces giving full faith and credit to the judgments of other
provinces was a “constitutional imperative[],” and while provinces may
enact legislation regarding the recognition of judgments of other
provinces, Morguard established a minimum threshold for order and
fairness which the provinces must respect.159
The international undertones of Morguard and its emphasis on
the importance of order and fairness, subsequently echoed in Hunt,
were expressed together in McNichol Estate v. Woldnik.160 McNichol Estate
involved a Florida chiropractor, Dr. Puentes, being sued in Ontario
following the death of Louis McNichol, an Ontario resident who died
in Florida.161 Dr. Puentes was the only non-resident of Ontario named
in the lawsuit.162 Dr. Puentes argued to have the real and substantial
connection test applied to him separately from the other defendants.
The Ontario Court of Appeal refused to do so.163
Rationalizing why it chose not to apply the real and substantial
test to Dr. Puentes separately, the Court argued to do so “would be a
step backwards . . . away from the recognition of the increasingly
complex and interdependent nature of the modern world community
which lies at the heart of [Morguard’s and Hunt’s] reasoning.”164 Further,
the Court wrote, “it would mute the influence of the underlying
requirements of order and fairness.”165 The decision of the Court
emphasizes that the order and fairness dictated by the real and
substantial connection test extends beyond inter-provincial disputes to
foreign disputes.
2. What is a real and substantial connection?: The modern real and
substantial connection doctrine.- While the Canadian Supreme Court chose
not to expand upon the real and substantial connection test in Hunt,
the Ontario Court of Appeal did do so in Muscutt v. Courcelles.166 The
Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 324.
McNichol v. Woldnik, [2001] CanLII 5679 (ON CA).
161
Id. at para. 1.
162
Id.
163
Id. at para. 12-15.
164
McNichol, 2001 CanLII at para. 12.
165
Id.
166
See Muscutt,(2002) CanLII. 44957. The Canadian Court system is
similar to that of the United States. Provincial trial courts appeal to provincial courts
of appeal, which appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, just as American
159
160
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Ontario court listed eight factors to consider when determining
whether a forum can ascertain jurisdiction over a foreign defendant:
the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim; the
connection between the forum and the defendant; unfairness to the
defendant in assuming jurisdiction; unfairness to the plaintiff in not
assuming jurisdiction; the involvement of other parties to the suit; the
court’s willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial
judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; whether the case
is inter-provincial or international in nature; and comity and the
standards of jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing
elsewhere.167
Legal Scholar Tonya Monestier notes that the Supreme Court
of Canada never explicitly endorsed the Muscutt factors.168 The Ontario
Court of Appeal, following the rationale of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s opinion in Morguard, believed that fairness to both parties was
important, and that the eight factors provided for fairness as well as
flexibility, as Morguard discussed.169 This led to the biggest criticism of
the Muscutt factors: only the first two factors actually dealt with a
connection of any sort between the forum and the claim or
defendant.170 Despite this criticism from scholars, the Muscutt factors
were considered influential in other provinces.171
The eight factors were challenged in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van
Breda.172 The Canadian Supreme Court found it necessary to more
clearly articulate factors defining what a real and substantial connection
appellate courts can act in the absence of action by the Supreme Court, so can
provincial appellate courts in Canada.
167
Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 (Can.) at para. 75-104.
168
Monestier, supra note 6, at 183.
169
See Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 at para. 72, 86-88; see also Monestier,
supra note 6, at 193-94.
170
See Monestier, supra note 6, at 184 (“[The final six factors] are not
strictly concerned with the connection of the forum to the parties and the cause of
action.”) (quoting Bastarache J., in Castillo v. Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, para. 45)); Stephen
G.A. Pitel, Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection, 60 U.N.B.L.J. 177, 182 (2010);
see also Blom, supra note 123, at 394 (“Only the first two of the eight factors are strictly
factual in nature”).
171
Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, (Can.) para. 48-51
available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/8004/index.do.
172
See Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.).
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is, in line with current trends in Canadian jurisprudence.173 The Van
Breda Court acknowledged that this was the direction the Ontario
Court of Appeal was heading in, but that the list of connecting factors
should not include factors based on fairness, efficiency, and comity.174
As a result, the Canadian Supreme Court replaced the list of
eight factors in Muscutt with four factors of its own: the defendant was
domiciled in the province; the defendant carries on business in the
province175; the tort was committed in the province; and a contract
connected with the dispute was created in the province.176 In creating
these four connecting factors, the Court rejected the fairness and injury
factors from Muscutt on the grounds that they are too attenuated and
should not be separated from the factual factors announced in Van
Breda.177
Of particular interest to this comment is the Van Breda court’s
removal of the Muscutt factor considering whether an action is interprovincial or international in nature. The Court determined that issues
relating to foreign law may remain helpful in determining
jurisdiction.178 However, it cautioned that focusing on juridical
disadvantages in jurisdictional analysis is not “consonant with the
principle of comity which should govern legal relationships between
modern democratic states.”179
The four connecting factors create a rebuttable presumption
for the defendant, but do not create a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the plaintiff.180 Thus, the Van Breda Court moved from what it saw
as an over-inclusive, unpredictable list of factors, to a more fact-based,
See id., 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 75-79 (indicating that the CJPTA
and other sources of jurisprudence need to be aligned with a set of rebuttable
presumptive factors).
174
Id. ¶¶ 74, 79, 82, 84.
175
See id. ¶ 87 (recognizing that though carrying on business in the
province may be a presumptive factor in favor of jurisdiction, there are some
business activities such as advertising and web site access in the jurisdiction which
cannot give rise to a presumption of jurisdiction).
176
Id. ¶ 90(d).
177
Id. ¶¶ 84-89.
178
Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 63.
179
Id.
180
See id. ¶¶ 92-93; see also Pliszka, supra note 129, at 277.
173
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clear set of factors for determining whether a real and substantial
connection exists.181 As an example of this rebuttable presumption, the
Court posed the hypothetical situation in which the factor at issue is
that a defendant carries on business in the forum.182 According to the
court, a possible rebuttal to this presumption is that the subject matter
of the suit is unrelated to the defendant’s business activities in the
forum, similar to one of the categories of cases identified in International
Shoe.183
Van Breda involved a couple who contracted in Ontario with
Club Resorts Ltd. for sport services at a club in Cuba, managed by
Club Resorts.184 Shortly after the trip began, Ms. Van Breda was
catastrophically injured on the beach when a metal contraption
collapsed on her.185 Upon return from Cuba, Ms. Van Breda and Mr.
Berg moved to Calgary and British Columbia, but never returned to
Ontario.186
Relying on the four presumptive factors created by the
Canadian Supreme Court, the Court held that the Ontario court could
exercise jurisdiction.187 The Court reasoned that because the contract
for services was created in Ontario, the Ontario court properly claimed
jurisdiction.188 According to the court the injury resulted from the
obligations created by the contractual relationship which began in
Ontario.189

See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 4.
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 96.
183
Id.; cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (continuous and systematic contacts
may not be enough to support jurisdiction).
184
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 2-3 (The contract created an
obligation for Mr. Berg to teach two hours of tennis per day at the resort in return
for room and board at the resort for himself and Ms. Van Breda).
185
Id. ¶ 4.
186
Id.
187
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 118.
188
Id. ¶ 117. The court determined that Club Resorts’ advertising in
Ontario was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because advertising is often
international or global, and allowing advertising to confer jurisdiction would subject
large commercial organizations to jurisdiction almost anywhere in the world, id. ¶
114.
189
Id. ¶ 117.
181
182
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Despite the shift in Van Breda to a more delineated set of
factors, Monestier believes that the court too quickly discounted
“fairness” to achieve “order.”190 While Monestier acknowledges that
the Canadian Supreme Court moved in the correct direction with its
decision in Van Breda, she believes the Court moved to a system which
is too rigid.191 While this is a fair criticism of the Van Breda decision,
the general consensus is that the change was a much needed one, as
Ms. Monestier herself acknowledges.192 The shift by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Van Breda recognizes the Court’s desire to dissipate
the attempt to balance “fairness” and “order” in favor of order.193
II.

ANALYSIS

As Ms. Monestier points out, the change in tide made by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda ushers in a new understanding
and era of ex juris jurisdiction in Canada.194 Because of the new
direction of Canadian ex juris jurisdiction, the Canadian Supreme Court
has more closely aligned ex juris jurisdiction in Canada with that of the
United States. As a result, the United States and Canada will be able to
increase comity with one another resulting in greater cooperation in
transnational cases. Further, greater cooperation between the two
nations may further smooth the path for increasing economic ties with
one another.
A.

A Fading Border: Closing the Gap Between Canadian
Jurisdiction and American Jurisdiction

Professor Black acknowledges that recognition of foreign
judgments is more likely when the two countries involved have similar

Monestier, supra note 6, at 398.
Id. at 412.
192
Id. at 410-11; see also Pliszka, supra note 129.
193
See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410; compare Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17
(Can.) at para. 99 (stating that a court is not required to hear only the tort which
could be connected with the jurisdiction when there are multiple torts at issue), with
McNichol, (2001) CanLII 5679 at para. 12 (“I do not agree that where an action has
some claims with an extra-territorial dimension, and others which have none, the
former must be tested in isolation”).
194
See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410-11.
190
191
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or identical standards for personal jurisdiction.195 As the new tide in
Canadian ex juris jurisdiction commences, the Van Breda factors appear
to align the new Canadian jurisdiction closer to that of the United
States.196
1. Van Breda Factors One and Two: A Defendant-Centric Approach.
– The first Van Breda factor, whether or not the defendant was
domiciled in the province, aligns itself well with the minimum contacts
doctrine provided in International Shoe.197 At the base of Justice Stone’s
approach in International Shoe is the previous notion of personal
jurisdiction dating back to Pennoyer, a defendant domiciled in a state is
subject to personal jurisdiction.198 This a very defendant-centric
approach.
The first Van Breda factor has brought personal jurisdiction in
Canada to a clear, defendant-centric approach as well.199 The court
stated that a plaintiff’s presence in a jurisdiction is not sufficient to
create a relationship between the jurisdiction and the subject matter,
but that a defendant may always be sued in a jurisdiction in which he
resides.200 This language has the same basic notion as that in Pennoyer,
the defendant’s domicile is the important consideration.201 Further, by
looking at Keeton, the United States Supreme Court’s relative disinterest
in the domicile of the plaintiff is just as clear as that of the Canadian
Supreme Court.202

195
See Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and Credit Clause?,
18 SW. J. INT’L L. 595, 606-10 (2011).
196
See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Keeton, 465 U.S. 770; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; Hess, 274 U.S. 352; Gray, 22 Ill. 2d
432; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.).
197
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para.
86.
198
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
199
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 {Can.) at para. 86; see also Pliszka, supra
note 129, at 5-6.
200
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 86.
201
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
202
Compare Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (stating that a plaintiff’s “lack of
residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant’s
contacts”), with Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 at para. 86 (stating that a plaintiff’s
presence in a jurisdiction “will not create a presumptive relationship between the
forum and either the subject matter of the litigation or the defendant”).
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Van Breda’s second factor, whether the defendant carries on
business within the province, is linked to the idea of purposeful
availment, originating in Gray v. American Radiator,203 but first used by
the United States Supreme Court in Worldwide Volkswagen.204 Once
again this factor, like its American counterpart, is defendant-centric.205
The Canadian Supreme Court determined that the broad
announcement of a rule relating to the business activities of a
defendant in a forum was ill-advised.206 The United States Supreme
Court came to this same conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen.207
Additionally, the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation of
this factor is similar to general jurisdiction in the United States.208 Part
of the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation states one way to satisfy
this factor is through “maintaining an office [in the jurisdiction].”209
Such reasoning is precisely what the United States Supreme Court used
in Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co. to determine the defendant was
domiciled in Ohio.210
While the first two Van Breda factors have aligned U.S. and
Canadian personal jurisdiction as they relate to the domicile and
business activities of the defendant, the last two factors revolve around
the subject matter at dispute in a case.
2. Van Breda Factors Three and Four: Subject Matter Focus. - Van
Breda’s third factor, whether the tort was committed in the province,
finds an American counterpart in both Pawloski and Keeton.211 This

203
204
205
206
207
208

See Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 441.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6.
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13,

at 551.
Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87.
See Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
211
See Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (considering the desire of the jurisdiction in
which the harm was incurred to resolve the case); see also Hess, 274 U.S. 352 (involving
a car accident in a jurisdiction the defendant did not reside in); Van Breda, [2012]
SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88.
209
210
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factor and the fourth factor both focus on the subject matter at
dispute.212
While the minimum contacts doctrine focuses on the
defendant’s locale and actions, it also examines the impact of the tort
action in the jurisdiction.213 Keeton serves as the best example. The
Keeton court focused attention on the idea that the state in which the
tort took place has an interest in remedying the harm done within its
borders.214
The Van Breda Court appears to be addressing the same
concern through this factor. It describes Tolofson v. Jensen215 as the
common law starting point for serious consideration of the situs of a
tort as a factor to consider in jurisdictional analysis.216 Tolofson
determined that in some tort cases, the lex loci delicti must apply to help
preserve order.217
Van Breda’s fourth factor, whether a contract connected with
the dispute was made in the province, finds similarities to Burger King.218
Both cases place upon their respective jurisdictional standards an
impetus to consider the creation of a contract sufficient for
recognizing jurisdiction over the parties.219 In doing such both courts
concerned themselves with addressing the impact of the subject matter
at dispute in determining jurisdiction.

See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6.
See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. 770.
214
See id. at 776.
215
Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994]
3
S.C.R.
1022
available
at
https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/item/1209/index.do (then click on PDF document).
216
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88.
217
Tolofson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 1058.
218
See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para.
88.
219
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480-81; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at
para. 88.
212
213
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Recognition of Foreign Judgments

Since the decision in Morguard, Canada has been recognizing
and enforcing United States’ judgments with more consistency. 220
Justice LaForest wrote in Morguard, “[m]odern times [require that] the
flow of wealth, skills, and people across boundaries be facilitated in a
fair and orderly manner.”221 Thus, while Morguard is limited to intraprovincial judgment disputes,222 Canadian courts have expanded its
mandate to include foreign judgments.223
The Canadian Supreme Court emphasized in Van Breda that
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments are intertwined.224 As a
result, the framework used in determining a court’s jurisdiction can
have an impact on a court’s recognition of judgments and vise versa.225
Further, in Muscutt, the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that one
aspect of comity includes the consideration of jurisdictional standards
as well as judgment recognition and enforcement in other countries.226
Considering this, along with Black’s observation that greater
international judgment recognition occurs when countries have similar
personal jurisdiction standards, the opportunity for increased comity
between the United States and Canada is greater after Van Breda.
The choice by Canadian courts to expand recognition and
enforcement to foreign judgments has not been applauded by all of
Canada, its legal scholars, and even its courts and judges.227 However,
as Canadian attorney Allison Sears notes, “[i]t seems a fair assumption
however, that the ease with which the Court embraced the extension
220
See Black, supra note 195, at 612; Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S.
Judgments in Canada: “Things are Looking Up!”, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 491, 491 (199495).
221
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1078 (Can.).
222
See Ivankovich, supra note 220, at 499.
223
See Black, supra note 195, at 612.
224
See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 16.
225
Id.
226
See Muscutt, [2002] CanLII 44957 at para. 102.
227
See, e.g., Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. (2011) c. 162; see also Civil
Code of Quebec, S.Q., c. 64, arts. 3155-63 (1991); Allison M. Sears, Beals v. Saldanha:
The International Implications of Morguard Made Clear, 68 SASK. L. REV. 223, 229-30
(2005) (stating Justice LeBel disagreed with the majority in Beals v. Saldanha, (2003)
SCC 72, believing that the test should be focused more on fairness to the defendant).
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of Morguard into the international realm was largely due to the similarity
between the Canadian and American legal systems.”228
Even more so than Canada, the United States recognizes and
enforces Canadian judgments. To this effect, a majority of states have
adopted statutes similar to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act.229 This act allows for recognition of foreign court
judgments which are final, conclusive, and enforceable where
rendered.230
One of the three requirements for non-recognition is that the
foreign court lacks personal jurisdiction.231 As a result, though Canada
and the United States have much in common with one another and, to
an extent, already recognize and enforce one another’s judgments,
bringing the two countries’ standards for personal jurisdiction closer
together will likely decrease the opportunity for this non-recognition
requirement to materialize.
Because both countries currently recognize one another’s
judgments with very little friction, the impact of aligning the two
standards for personal jurisdiction will not be all that substantial.
However, though the impact seems minimal, it is an issue which is
worthy of discussion.232 Four Canadian provinces do not currently
apply the Morguard standard to American judgments.233
Further, there is Canadian legislation limiting recognition in
certain areas, most notably, antitrust and judgments rendered under
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.234
While the LIBERTAD issue is substantially legislative, further
aligning personal jurisdiction standards may encourage those
Sears, supra note 227, at 242.
Todd J. Burke, Canadian Class Actions and Federal Judgments: Recognition
of Foreign Class Actions in Canada, BUS. LAW TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 48.
230
13 U.L.A. 261 § 1(2) (1986).
231
Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3).
232
See Black, supra note 195, at 619.
233
New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia do not enforce foreign
judgments, and Saskatchewan will only enforce the damages portion of a judgment,
but not the punitive portions. See Black, supra note 192, at 613-14.
234
See Black, supra note 195, at 614.
228
229
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provinces which take issue with enforcing foreign judgments to
become more cooperative with U.S. courts in recognizing judgments.
Similarity between the two standards may provide greater assurance
that the treatment parties in Canada receive is similar to that received
by parties litigating in the United States.235
Are there other measures which would be more appropriate?
Numerous authors have written about the idea of either a bilateral
treaty or enforcement convention to assist the two countries in their
recognition of one another’s judgments.236 However, as professor
Black acknowledges, the chances of the legislatures of either country
taking the required initiative to enact such a treaty or convention is not
particularly likely.237 With the floundering likelihood that these
measures will be taken, bridging the gap between the two countries’
personal jurisdiction standards seems to present itself as a more viable
solution, or at the very least, a holdover until a more definite solution
can be achieved.
C.

Van Breda’s Implications for Foreign Class Action Suits

Moving beyond enforcement of one another’s judgments, the
new real and substantial framework defined in Van Breda has its
greatest implications in cases that have yet to be decided. More
specifically, in the future of transnational class action suits.238
When it comes to a Canadian court recognizing a class action
judgment rendered in the United States, one of the major factors, and
only one concerning this comment, in determining whether to enforce
the judgment is whether there is a “real and substantial connection in
favor of the foreign jurisdiction.”239 Canada and the United States

See id. at 610.
See, e.g., Black, supra note 195 (discussing his view that an enforcement
convention between the U.S. and Canada, while also evaluating other scholars’
suggestions regarding conventions and treaties).
237
See id. at 625.
238
See Burke, supra note 229, at 51 (noting that proper jurisdiction is a
major factor in recognition of class action judgments in Canada).
239
Burke, supra note 229, at 50 (citing Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants
of Canada Ltd., (2005) CanLII 3360 (ON CA)).
235
236
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differ from one another in certain aspects of class action litigation,
including how classes are defined240 and issue requirements.241
As Currie informs us, the presence of a real and substantial
connection is important.242 This requirement is also expressed in the
United States in the Uniform Money Judgment Enforcement Act.243
Thus, the movement towards similar standards of personal jurisdiction
has the potential to increase the frequency of recognition of United
States class actions which include Canadian citizens.
To what extent the new definition of the real and substantial
connection standard will have on class actions is still unproven. More
specifically, how many of the members in a class will have to meet the
standards set forth in Van Breda?244 The direction of Canadian courts
is likely to lead to a requirement that only one of the class members
meets one of the presumptive Van Breda factors.245 This determination
finds support in the Canadian focus on common issues class
definition.246
However, this is the point at which a question arises regarding
whether class actions based in Canada will be enforced in the United
States since American courts define classes based on amount in
controversy requirements.247 The history of U.S. recognition of
Canadian judgments and the importance put on a minimum
contacts/real and substantial connection under the Uniform Act, along
240
The United States has a numerosity requirement for a class to be
created. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Canada only requires two persons to create a class. Class
Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C., c. 50, §§ 4(1), 7, 27 (1996); Class Proceedings Act 1992,
S.O., c. 6, §§ 5(1), 6, 25 (1992); see also Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v.
Dutton, [2001] SCC 46, at para. 37.
241
The United States has an amount in controversy requirement to certify
a class. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Canada requires that there be a common issue to certify a
class. See, e.g., B.C. Class Proceedings Act, Division 3, Part 3, s. 20(3)(a).
242
See Currie, [2005] [Can.] CanLII 3360 at paras. 11-2.
243
See Burke, supra note 229, at 51.
244
See David Paulson, Note, Canada Update: A New Framework for
Determining Jurisdiction, the Application of Forum Non Conveniens, and Limitations of the
Solicitor-Client Privilege, 18 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 411, 416-17 (2012).
245
See id. at 417.
246
See B.C. Class Proceedings Act s. 20(3)(a); see also Burke, supra note
226, at 49.
247
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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with Justice Winkler’s recognition that “practical differences [between
U.S. and Canadian classes] are more apparent than real,” leads to the
belief that the new Van Breda factors are more likely to lead to greater
cross-border enforcement than detract from it.248
D.

What’s to Become of Us?: The Implications of Van Breda on
the U.S.-Canadian Trade Partnership

Finally, the implications of the Van Breda decision on comity
and trade between the two nations is of significant importance. Justice
LaForest noted the importance of movement of people, skills, and
wealth.249 In 2013 the U.S. exported 277,038.3 million dollars worth of
goods to Canada while importing 305,384.8 million dollars worth of
goods from Canada.250 The staggering amount of trade that these two
countries share illustrates the importance of the economic friendship
between these nations. While that partnership has been in existence
for decades and will likely continue for decades to come, what
underlies those numbers is the sheer amount of interaction that U.S.
and Canadian persons and companies have with one another. From
interaction, conflict arises. That conflict must be directed toward the
courts of either the U.S., Canada, or both. The increased efficiency that
the Van Breda decision provides may be miniscule or large. Only time
will tell. However, as Professor Black notes, to shrug off the minor
differences between the U.S. and Canadian courts regarding personal
jurisdiction would be a mistake.251 Those differences do not produce
much wake in the individual case, but in the aggregate the transaction
costs become much more significant.252 With a partnership as large as
that of the U.S. and Canada, the alignment of their personal jurisdiction
standards may have a positive effect on lessening those transaction
costs and thus trade costs.253

248
See Burke, supra note 229, at 51 (quoting Justice Winkler in regards to
the Nortel Networks litigation).
249
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096.
250
Trade in Goods with Canada, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html(last visited Jan. 26,
2014).
251
See Black, supra note 195, at 619.
252
See id. at 617, 624.
253
See id. at 617.

554

2015

Johnson

4:1

CONCLUSION
The development of personal jurisdiction over ex juris
defendants has developed in the form of the minimum contacts test in
the United States, and the real and substantial connection standard in
Canada. Both tests value the importance of fairness and order.
The minimum contacts test has evolved into a test which
focuses on the connection between the defendant and the forum. It
was not until 2012 that Canada caught up. Prior to the Van Breda
decision, the real and substantial connection standard focused on the
plaintiff, defendant, and nature of the claim. Van Breda narrowed that
focus to the defendant and subject matter of a claim, further aligning
the U.S. and Canadian personal jurisdiction standards.
As a result, greater comity between the U.S. and Canada can
ensue. While as of late there has not been large amounts of friction
between these two countries, commentators have noted that even a
small amount of friction is worth addressing, because aggregate
transaction costs involved in a trade partnership as large as that the
U.S. and Canada have can be large.
Any steps toward streamlining transactions, in this case judicial
cooperation, comity, and judgment recognition, can help in reducing
those costs. Reduced transaction costs leads to more efficient trade
and a greater relationship between the U.S. and Canada.
Realistically, the impact of the Van Breda decision will likely be
relatively small in respect to the relationship between the U.S. and
Canada, but as Pink Floyd sang “[it’s] just another brick in the wall.”254

PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall Part 2, on THE WALL (Columbia
Records 1979).
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